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Creators/Authors contains: "Sadiraj, Vjollca"

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  1. ; ; (, Economic Inquiry)
    We develop and analyze a dynamic model of individual taxpayer compliance choice that predicts “audit state dependent taxpayer compliance,” by distinguishing between forward‐looking versus myopic versus naïve behavior. We then test experimentally the audit state dependent model by reporting the results from the first tax compliance experiment run in Colombia. We find that subjects' compliance rates increase with greater enforcement. We also find more novel results: fine rates should be increased after an audit, and “nudging” myopic individuals toward reporting a constant rather than a fluctuating proportion of income would benefit both the taxpayer and the tax authority.(JELH26, C91) 
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  2. ; ; (, Economic Inquiry)
    We report an experiment on payoff‐equivalent, sequential provision and appropriation games with high‐ and low‐caste Indian villagers. A central question is whether caste identities affect resolution of social dilemmas. Making caste salient elicits striking changes in behavior compared to baseline treatment with no information about others' castes. Homogenous groups with high caste villagers are more successful in resolving social dilemmas than homogenous groups with low caste villagers. The success of mixed‐caste groups is somewhere between, which is inconsistent with a group identity model. Absent salient information on caste, behavior is inconsistent with unconditional social preferences but as predicted by reciprocity. (JELC93, H41, Z13) 
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